Calvinism and Secondary Causation

Al-Ghazali, the medieval Islamic philosopher-mystic, famously argued that the prevailing Aristotelian conception of causation was wrong for one main reason: Since God is the cause of every event, nothing else could be the cause of any. Take any instance of cause and effect: drinking water satisfying thirst; eating satisfying hunger; the strike of a match to fire. To Ghazali, what seems to be causation is merely association:

For the connexion in these things is based on a prior power of God to create them in a successive order, though not because this connexion is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined-on the contrary, it is in God’s power to create satiety without eating, and death without decapitation, and to let life persist notwithstanding the decapitation, and so on with respect to all connexions... Indeed, the philosophers have no other proof than the observation of the occurrence of the burning, when there is contact with fire, but observation proves only a simultaneity, ‘ not a causation, and, in reality, there is no other cause but God. Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers

So God and his angels fabricate every event from scratch. What we see as one seamless reality is a series of creations woven around and in us in quick succession. For Ghazali, the upshot was a God who is in and around and beyond and besides. God is greatest when he creates, so he must be constantly creating! Ghazali's philosophy (called occasionalism today) was influential in his time but seems too fantastic to be taken seriously today. However, his argument can be modernized and applied to another school of religious thought that is far closer to mainstream Christian thought.

What Calvinism Teaches

As explained by the Westminster Confession, Calvinism affirms that

in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He orders them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

According to the confession, every event that occurs is caused by God's decrees. God is the "first" cause. Every event he decrees occurs immutably and infallibly (adjectives we normally apply to God himself). The confession goes on to clarify that everything occurs, not by God's "bare permission, but such as has joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding." God doesn't just let things happen. He causes things to happen immutably and infallibly. However - and here's where it gets interesting - these events follow after "secondary" causes.

So, in sum, every event that occurs was decreed by God to occur. God's decree is the sufficient cause of any given event. By "sufficient cause" I mean that once God issues the decree, it is certain that the event will occur. That's how I define the Calvinist doctrine of God's providence. I know not all Calvinists would describe it the way I have - some, like Piper and Sproul have used permissive language to describe God's decretive will. If they really mean it, then I'm not talking about their conception of providence.

The Problem: Moral Responsibility

Assuming God's providence as Calvinists see it, how can God not be guilty of sin? The traditional response, encapsulated within the confession quoted above, is that God doesn't commit sin because he ordains it indirectly via human actors who commit the sin. This explanation seeks to distinguish God, the "first" cause, from man, the "second" cause. The person who immutably, infallibly predetermines the commission is the first cause. The person who commits the sin is the second cause.

I think this explanation is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, but for now I highlight a critical assumption: man's actions are causes too. I argue that, assuming a Calvinistic conception of providence, then no secondary causes could exist. If no secondary causes exist, God is not only the first cause but also the only cause.

What do I mean by "cause"? 

For now, I'll assume a counter-factual definition of causation. A causes B in the sense if A hadn't happened, B would not have happened. The rain caused the floor to be wet because if it hadn't rained, the floor would not have been wet. This is the most intuitive sense of causation (at least to me), and also bears the advantage of being the model used in most courts to adjudicate issues of causation.

The doctrine of God's decretive will is cloaked in mystery - how exactly does a decree cause an event? Does a decree violate the laws of thermodynamics? Does a decree come true like magic or is it administered by angels? However mysterious they are, however, God's decrees have to be causal at least in the counter-factual sense. God’s decree is a cause of X, Y and Z. Had God not decreed X, Y or Z, they would not have occurred. Thus, God's decrees are the counter-factual causes of X, Y and Z. That shouldn’t be controversial. If decrees aren't counter-factual causes, then necessarily, events may occur even absent any decree, which means the collapse of the Calvinistic doctrine of God's providence. So God's decrees are counter-factual causes, okay? Okay.

The Argument 

Let's suppose God decrees that X at T1. Let's call this decree Decree 1. God also decrees that Y happen at T2, very soon after T2. Let's call this Decree 2. X represents "John lighting the tablecloth on fire". Y represents "the tablecloth bursts into flames."

For X to have caused Y in the counter-factual sense, then had X not happened, Y would not have happened. But here, God decreed both X and Y. Thus, if X had not occurred, Y would have still happened, since God decreed Y. Thus, X could not have been a cause of Y. It's not lighting the tablecloth on fire that causes it to burst into flames. It's Decree 2 that causes it to burst into flames. Sure, you might have seen the cloth burst into flames soon after it catches fire. But as Al-Ghazali has taught us, looks can be deceiving.

You can generalize this with any event, and the same result follows. Just look at any event and identify the putative cause and effect (X and Y). Then ask, Did God decree X, and did God decree Y? If he did, then X could not have caused Y. As Ghazali concludes, in "reality, there is no cause but God." And if there's no cause but God, there are no secondary causes. And if no secondary causes, no grounds for man's responsibility.

Perhaps I can distill all of this into a syllogism.

1. Y occurred.
2. X occurred before Y.
3. Whatever occurs is decreed by God.
4. Therefore, Y was decreed by God.
5.  If X did not occur, Y would still occur.  (logically follows from [4]).
6. Therefore, X was not the cause of Y.

Cheers,
Finney