Problems with Penal Substitutionary Atonement

1. If Jesus physically died in our place, why do we still physically die?
2. If Jesus' death were enough for our salvation, why does Paul say if he were not risen we would still be in our sins?
3. More to the point, what did Jesus' resurrection accomplish? It seems an unnecessary add-on, assuming PSA.

The Euthyphro Dilemma for Divine Determinists

Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

Ever since Socrates' conversation with Euthyphro, this little riddle has produced oceans of ink about the nature of morality. In its modern form, the dilemma asks, "Is the good good because God commands so, or does God say it is good because it is good?"

If you agree to the first proposition, then you run into the horn of arbitrariness: if God commanded the murder of an innocent child, it would be good and indeed obligatory. It would also seem  that moral propositions do not express objective truths about the world around us.  Finally, it would render the expression "God is good" somewhat incoherent, as "good" is merely shorthand for "whatever God commands." If you agree to the second proposition, however you run into another horn: that morality is independent of God's commands. Unless you're ready to give up the Torah in exchange for the Tao, this is not a palatable option.

One effective response by philosopher Steve Lovell is that morality is rooted in God's nature, not his commands. Thus, moral principles derive their validity ultimately not from God's commands, but his loving and just nature. The good is good because it is derived from God's unchanging character. God commands us to love because we're made in his image, and God is love. There have been some objections to Divine Nature Theory ("DNT") but for now it seems to be the strongest response to the dilemma.

The critical assumption underlying the DNT is that God only commands what he actually wants people to do. A command is only good insofar as it reflects God's actual desires, and thus if God issued a command he secretly did not want fulfilled, DNT would not apply. So for a command to reflect his nature, it reflects his desires.

Can Calvinists avail themselves of DNT? I argue they cannot. Calvinists believe God may command X but in fact strongly desire Y.  This is so because God is the cause of every event, including every violation of his commands. Sometimes referred to as the "two wills of God", it has been a sore point in debates between Arminians and Calvinists. Jonathan Edwards:

The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and the law of God; because we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted another.

Edwards then argues there is no contradiction between God's commanding one thing and desiring another, since where the two wills diverge, God does not actually desire that the command be followed. Since the two wills are defined differently, and only the secret will reflects God's actual desires, their divergence does not imply contradiction. I agree with Edwards here.  The two wills doctrine as crafted by Calvinists is not contradictory.

Nevertheless, by divorcing God's commands from his desires, Edwards exposes his theology to the horns of the dilemma. God's commands do not reflect his desires in every instance those commands are not followed (which is nearly all the time!). As such, Calvinists cannot benefit from DNT. They can't reasonably claim God's moral commands reflect his actual desires for human beings, when most of the time they do not. And since they do not reflect his actual desires, they are not rooted in his nature (since his desires express his nature). 

So then, it seems Calvinists face three choices: give up a coherent morality. Give up God's sovereignty. Or, propose their own solution to the Euthyphro dilemma. I'm all ears for another way out. 

The function of the 'remnant' in Romans 11

The 'remnant' of Israel reveal's God's continuing faithfulness to the nation of Israel.

I ask then: Did God reject his people? By no means! I am an Israelite myself, a descendant of Abraham, from the tribe of Benjamin.

As a member of the tribe of Benjamin, Paul is an ethnic Israelite. As a Christian, he is a member of the 'remnant'. He cites his dual membership as a token that God didn't reject "his people". As FF Bruce puts it, the remnant receives tokens of grace meant to be distributed to all without distinction.

Likewise, Tim Gallant writes, the current state of preservation is not to be understood as the permanent ideal; it is the means to an end, the bridge to a further destination.

Calvinism and the Security of Atonement

More thoughts about Calvinism.

I've often heard that in Calvinism, Jesus' death actually "secured" our salvation, whereas in Arminianism it only made it possible.  Actually, I think in Calvinism Jesus' death didn't secure our salvation. 

What does it mean to "secure" one's salvation?  Let's start with what it can't mean.  It can't mean that it was the final event necessary to make you saved, and most Calvinists agree.  Regeneration and faith are also necessary preludes to salvation. 

But perhaps we can understand "secure" to mean "guarantee".  And here's the test that something has secured our salvation.  It's secured our salvation in the sense that because of it, it is now impossible for us not to be saved. 

Given this understanding of security, then given Calvinism, Jesus' death secured our salvation in the sense that by his dying for us, he made it impossible for us not to be saved.  His death thus guaranteed our salvation. 

But for Jesus' death to make our salvation secure, our salvation must have been insecure prior to his death.  But this is impossible, given Calvinism.  Long before Jesus died, God decreed and predestined our salvation.  And that decree made it certain that we would be saved.  If it was already made certain by God's decree, it could not have been "made" certain or "secured" by any other event in or out of history.  Thus, Given Calvinism, Jesus' death could not have secured one's salvation.  

Calvinism and Secondary Causation

Al-Ghazali, the medieval Islamic philosopher-mystic, famously argued that the prevailing Aristotelian conception of causation was wrong for one main reason: Since God is the cause of every event, nothing else could be the cause of any. Take any instance of cause and effect: drinking water satisfying thirst; eating satisfying hunger; the strike of a match to fire. To Ghazali, what seems to be causation is merely association:

For the connexion in these things is based on a prior power of God to create them in a successive order, though not because this connexion is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined-on the contrary, it is in God’s power to create satiety without eating, and death without decapitation, and to let life persist notwithstanding the decapitation, and so on with respect to all connexions... Indeed, the philosophers have no other proof than the observation of the occurrence of the burning, when there is contact with fire, but observation proves only a simultaneity, ‘ not a causation, and, in reality, there is no other cause but God. Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers

So God and his angels fabricate every event from scratch. What we see as one seamless reality is a series of creations woven around and in us in quick succession. For Ghazali, the upshot was a God who is in and around and beyond and besides. God is greatest when he creates, so he must be constantly creating! Ghazali's philosophy (called occasionalism today) was influential in his time but seems too fantastic to be taken seriously today. However, his argument can be modernized and applied to another school of religious thought that is far closer to mainstream Christian thought.

What Calvinism Teaches

As explained by the Westminster Confession, Calvinism affirms that

in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He orders them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

According to the confession, every event that occurs is caused by God's decrees. God is the "first" cause. Every event he decrees occurs immutably and infallibly (adjectives we normally apply to God himself). The confession goes on to clarify that everything occurs, not by God's "bare permission, but such as has joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding." God doesn't just let things happen. He causes things to happen immutably and infallibly. However - and here's where it gets interesting - these events follow after "secondary" causes.

So, in sum, every event that occurs was decreed by God to occur. God's decree is the sufficient cause of any given event. By "sufficient cause" I mean that once God issues the decree, it is certain that the event will occur. That's how I define the Calvinist doctrine of God's providence. I know not all Calvinists would describe it the way I have - some, like Piper and Sproul have used permissive language to describe God's decretive will. If they really mean it, then I'm not talking about their conception of providence.

The Problem: Moral Responsibility

Assuming God's providence as Calvinists see it, how can God not be guilty of sin? The traditional response, encapsulated within the confession quoted above, is that God doesn't commit sin because he ordains it indirectly via human actors who commit the sin. This explanation seeks to distinguish God, the "first" cause, from man, the "second" cause. The person who immutably, infallibly predetermines the commission is the first cause. The person who commits the sin is the second cause.

I think this explanation is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, but for now I highlight a critical assumption: man's actions are causes too. I argue that, assuming a Calvinistic conception of providence, then no secondary causes could exist. If no secondary causes exist, God is not only the first cause but also the only cause.

What do I mean by "cause"? 

For now, I'll assume a counter-factual definition of causation. A causes B in the sense if A hadn't happened, B would not have happened. The rain caused the floor to be wet because if it hadn't rained, the floor would not have been wet. This is the most intuitive sense of causation (at least to me), and also bears the advantage of being the model used in most courts to adjudicate issues of causation.

The doctrine of God's decretive will is cloaked in mystery - how exactly does a decree cause an event? Does a decree violate the laws of thermodynamics? Does a decree come true like magic or is it administered by angels? However mysterious they are, however, God's decrees have to be causal at least in the counter-factual sense. God’s decree is a cause of X, Y and Z. Had God not decreed X, Y or Z, they would not have occurred. Thus, God's decrees are the counter-factual causes of X, Y and Z. That shouldn’t be controversial. If decrees aren't counter-factual causes, then necessarily, events may occur even absent any decree, which means the collapse of the Calvinistic doctrine of God's providence. So God's decrees are counter-factual causes, okay? Okay.

The Argument 

Let's suppose God decrees that X at T1. Let's call this decree Decree 1. God also decrees that Y happen at T2, very soon after T2. Let's call this Decree 2. X represents "John lighting the tablecloth on fire". Y represents "the tablecloth bursts into flames."

For X to have caused Y in the counter-factual sense, then had X not happened, Y would not have happened. But here, God decreed both X and Y. Thus, if X had not occurred, Y would have still happened, since God decreed Y. Thus, X could not have been a cause of Y. It's not lighting the tablecloth on fire that causes it to burst into flames. It's Decree 2 that causes it to burst into flames. Sure, you might have seen the cloth burst into flames soon after it catches fire. But as Al-Ghazali has taught us, looks can be deceiving.

You can generalize this with any event, and the same result follows. Just look at any event and identify the putative cause and effect (X and Y). Then ask, Did God decree X, and did God decree Y? If he did, then X could not have caused Y. As Ghazali concludes, in "reality, there is no cause but God." And if there's no cause but God, there are no secondary causes. And if no secondary causes, no grounds for man's responsibility.

Perhaps I can distill all of this into a syllogism.

1. Y occurred.
2. X occurred before Y.
3. Whatever occurs is decreed by God.
4. Therefore, Y was decreed by God.
5.  If X did not occur, Y would still occur.  (logically follows from [4]).
6. Therefore, X was not the cause of Y.

Cheers,
Finney

Guilt and Blindness in John 9

The story of the blind man in John 9 is a study in guilt. What makes us guilty, and what's the relation between guilt and our ability to obey and believe God?

Let's do a quick run through. The chapter opens with a question: Was the man born blind because of his sins, or the sins of his parents? To us, it seems obvious he was not born blind because of neonatal sins. But to Jews who were taught God doesn't punish children for the sins of their parents, the latter proposal is just as wrong. Jesus rejects this false dichotomy, announcing that he is blind so God's works may be shown in him.

After his sight is recovered, the man is brought to the Pharisees, who did not give him a warm reception; they reject Jesus' authority because he performed a miracle on a Saturday, and brand the healed man a sinner. When Jesus finds out what happened, he meets him, who then confessed, "Lord I believe."

At this point, Jesus announces a dramatic reversal: the blind shall see and the seeing shall be blind! The blind man has spiritual insight into Jesus' nature, and responds accordingly by worshiping. The Pharisees who should have recognized Jesus' nature, refuse to acknowledge him. And here's the lesson of the story: Jesus says to the Pharisees, If you were blind, you would not be guilty of sin; but now that you claim you can see, your guilt remains." In other words, mere blindness or inability to acknowledge Jesus is not, in and of itself, sinful. But willful blindness is. 

The Pharisees can recognize Jesus for who he is, or at least they claim they can see. Their own claim to see renders them guilty. Thus, God holds people responsible, neither for the sins of their parents (Ezek. 18), nor those sins of their own ignorance, but for their refusal to do what they can do. How does God judge them? He blinds them. Blinding is God's way of punishing people for refusing to use the eyes he gave them.

This should shape our understanding of God. God doesn't demand us to reap where he hasn't sown. He doesn't call us to seek him while wearing an invisibility cloak. (Isaiah 45:19). No. God is good. He "judges the world fairly." (Psalm 9:8) Since we live, move, and exist by his power, "he is not far from any one of us." (Acts 17:27-28). Thus, when God directs us to follow up, we may confidently say, "For by you I can run against a troop, and by my God I can leap over a wall."